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This article examines treaty interpretation based on consensus, or the idea that legal 
or political practice that is not directly related to a treaty can be used in interpreting 
it, or at least in granting more discretion to States Parties. The practice of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, contrasted with the well-settled practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights, reveals that consensus interpretation plays an 
important role in entrenching the legitimacy of international human rights courts. 
The Inter-American Court’s practice seems to rely on consensus when it supports a 
progressive, teleological interpretation of human rights. The article argues that this 
selective engagement eliminates the legitimacy-building possibilities of the consensus 
method of interpretation, but that the Inter-American Court, in seeking legitimacy not 
from States Parties, but other stakeholders, does not seem particularly concerned with 
legitimacy costs (even if it probably should).
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I. Introduction
International human rights tribunals, in interpreting the treaties that delegate competence to them in cases brought by individuals, often 
resort to a number of tools. These tools are frequently described in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1 [“Vienna Convention”]. Most 
notably among these is interpretation based on the object and purpose of 
the human rights treaty. But teleological interpretation of the text using 
intrinsic tools does not always yield the answers the human rights body 
needs, particularly in new areas of social activity. In these situations, 
human rights bodies, particularly the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”), have referred to “consensus” as a method of interpretation.
Consensus interpretation mediates tensions between different types 
of interpretation, even if it has fallen under the shadows of the margin of 
appreciation attributed to States.2 There are five key categories of consensus 
interpretation in the ECtHR jurisprudence: (1) consensus among States 
Parties of the Council of Europe; (2) international consensus identified 
by international treaties; (3) internal consensus within a State; (4) expert 
consensus; and (5) consensus among ECtHR judges.3 Tyrer v United 
Kingdom4 is the case that started the use of consensus as a means for 
1. 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 art 18 (entered into force 27 January 
1980) [Vienna Convention].
2. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “European Consensus: a way of reasoning” 
(2009) University College Dublin Law, Working Paper No 11/2009.
3. Ibid.
4. (1978), ECHR (Ser A) 24, 2 EHRR 1. 
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evolutive interpretation.5 In this case, corporal punishment of a minor 
was seen as no longer acceptable by the majority of States Parties to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms6 (“ECHR”). This triggered an evolution of the standard for 
Article 3 of the ECHR on cruel and degrading punishment.
The idea of regional consensus as a treaty interpretation tool has been 
explored in the European context as a means to articulate the ECtHR’s 
balancing of subsidiarity and the expansionist tendencies of interpreting 
an ever-evolving instrument.7 But the evolutive interpretation of the 
ECHR through consensus is one that almost seeks States Parties’ “pre-
approval” of the standard, before the ECtHR intervenes. The role of 
European consensus, as far as the ECtHR is concerned, also seems to 
be the maintenance of a certain degree of unity in the region, as well 
as finding common denominators in domestic human rights practice. 
In doing so, consensus interpretation enhances the legitimacy of the 
ECtHR.8
The functions of consensus interpretation are: (1) to enhance the 
legitimacy of a regional human rights court; (2) to persuade States 
Parties of said legitimacy, and make judgment thereby more acceptable; 
(3) to avoid arbitrary decision-making; (4) to determine the scope of 
subsidiarity; and (5) to help the court in dealing with new matters of 
interpretation of the treaty, or otherwise controversial or important 
5. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the 
European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015) at 139 [Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus]. 
6. 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 
1953).
7. See Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, supra note 5 (“European consensus 
operates on the edge of the margin of appreciation and evolutive 
interpretation; both of these are necessary to maintain the stability of the 
Strasbourg system, with the former preventing the ECtHR from going 
too far in developing human rights standards and the latter ensuring that 
the ECHR does not turn into a meaningless instrument preserving views 
from 60 years ago when the Convention was drafted, signed and ratified 
by the original Contracting Parties” at 129).
8. Ibid at 1.
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issues.9
Dzehtsiarou, in his monograph treatment of the topic, suggested 
that “European consensus should remain within European borders”, 
and it may not be suitable for transplantation to other regional human 
rights contexts.10 This piece takes on this challenge, and examines the 
idea of regional consensus in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(“IACtHR”). The Americas would seem like an ideal context for the use 
of consensus, since the majority of countries subject to the IACtHR’s 
jurisdiction share a linguistic and legal tradition, in contrast to the 
wider diversity found in Europe. This may even suggest that the use of 
consensus would be a given in the IACtHR’s practice, and the search for 
it is almost a moot exercise, at least from an epistemological perspective.11
In spite of regional similarities, though, there is relatively sparse 
practice by the Inter-American Court in dealing with consensus methods 
of interpretation. More often than not, the IACtHR uses consensus as 
only one tool in its arsenal, relying on other methods of interpretation in 
the same case. This mixed record can be at least partly explained by the 
IACtHR being progressive in other, sometimes more, legitimacy-costing 
ways. In fact, it seems that the IACtHR cherry picks interpretation 
methods that serve an aspiration to foster the protection of human rights, 
which coincides with the expansion of the IACtHR’s mandate. I argue 
that the IACtHR should take consensus interpretation more seriously as 
an interpretive tool in its case law, at least inasmuch as implementation 
of this method would require it being more deferential to states and 
subsidiarity as an initial step of its reasoning process. This choice is likely 
to translate into deeper entrenchment of the American Convention on 
Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica”12 (“ACHR”).
What follows discusses the uses of consensus interpretation methods 
by the IACtHR according to the different types of consensus, using 
Dzehtsiarou’s three first categories, outlined above (consensus using 
international law; consensus using comparative law, and; consensus 
9. Ibid at 184.
10. Ibid at 128.
11. I am thankful to Rosalind Dixon for this insight.
12. 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978).
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using domestic politics), as these are the categories the IACtHR has 
engaged with the most. Underlying this discussion is the question of 
the connection between consensus interpretation and legitimacy of the 
IACtHR. Throughout these sections, the doctrinal schema developed 
with respect to the ECtHR will serve to frame the discussion, which will 
then highlight the specific experience of the IACtHR.
II. Consensus via International Law
The use of international law as a means to build consensus is perhaps 
the most common way in which the IACtHR engages with this method. 
This is related to the notion, discussed below, that the IACtHR seems to 
seek consensus from yardsticks external to the States Parties to the ACHR 
that have accepted its jurisdiction. Before getting to that, though, it is 
important to say a few words about the IACtHR’s general approach to 
treaty interpretation.
A significant feature in the IACtHR’s approach to treaty 
interpretation is the evolutionary interpretation of treaties, but packaged 
in way that promotes the object and purpose of the ACHR, rather 
than changes in society. The IACtHR has frequently asserted that the 
American Convention and other instruments should be given a pro homine 
interpretation, that is, that they should be interpreted in the way that 
is most protective of human rights. This declared “bias” of the Court 
is another means of advancing interpretation in accordance with the 
purpose of the treaty; by choosing the pro homine way, the IACtHR 
dismisses the interpretation of its instrument according to the ordinary 
meaning of its words (the primary rule of interpretation) or any other 
traditional canons of interpretation, instead directly serving the teleology 
of the instrument.13 This approach seems to be somewhat at odds with 
13. Ricardo Canese v Paraguay (2004), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 111, at 
para 181; Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica (2004), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 
107, at para 184; Baena-Ricardo et al v Panama (2001), Inter-Am Ct HR 
(Ser C) No 72. For a broader discussion of treaty interpretation by the 
IACtHR, see Lucas Lixinski, “Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of 
International Law” (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 585.
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the ECtHR’s approach.14 While the ECtHR’s approach to evolutionary 
interpretation aims at updating the instrument, the IACtHR’s approach 
makes it so that there is an incidental effect of a much more fundamental 
and declared bias. It is thus less conducive to finding consensus as a 
baseline, or even to addressing consensus among Member States. It puts 
the IACtHR in a position largely out of sync with Member States, which 
seems to reflect other postures, discussed below.
The IACtHR also engages with the need to interpret the ACHR in 
light of changing circumstances. In Mapiripán Massacre v Columbia,15 
when analyzing the issue of attribution to the State of responsibility 
for human rights violations perpetrated by non-State actors, the Court 
stepped away from general rules of international law. By doing so, the 
Court affirmed the independence of human rights from the general 
international legal system, based precisely on the special character of 
human rights obligations due to the purposes of human rights treaties 
and obligations.16 The IACtHR then affirmed that human rights treaties 
must be interpreted in accordance with current circumstances, as opposed 
to an understanding based on an “original meaning”. In saying that, the 
IACtHR used not only Article 29 of the ACHR (which is specifically 
on interpretation rules), but also the rules of the Vienna Convention.17 
Further, in an Advisory Opinion, the IACtHR also reinforced the point 
that human rights considerations permeate other areas of international 
law. That is, when human rights interests are concerned, legal obligations 
should be interpreted in a dynamic manner so as to cover new situations 
14. Mark Toufayan, “Human Rights Treaty Interpretation: A Postmodern 
Account of Its Claim to “Speciality”” (2005) NYU Center for Human 
Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No 210 (arguing that there 
is no preferred method of interpretation in the European System). In 
a contrary sense, see Theodor Meron, “International Law in the Age of 
Human Rights: General Course on Public International Law” (2003) 301 
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 9 at 192-
93.
15. (2005), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 134.
16. Ibid at paras 104-108.
17. Ibid at para 106.
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on the basis of pre-existing rights.18 Therefore, in trying to articulate 
connections to broader areas of international law, the IACtHR will use 
the ACHR as a means to inject adaptability to changing circumstances 
into the law external to the Inter-American System. However, it seems 
more reluctant to invoke changing circumstances with respect to the 
ACHR itself, instead focusing on the pro homine method.
Consensus is often based on reliance on other international treaties.19 
This reliance helps clarify the scope of the treaty the human rights court 
is in charge of overseeing, and it also helps signal towards regional public 
opinion with respect to an issue. It is used by the IACtHR often in 
isolation, but increasingly also in conjunction with the domestic law 
of States Parties. For instance, in Kawas-Fernández v Honduras,20 the 
IACtHR used a combination of non-Inter-American treaties, domestic 
law of States Parties, and even an Inter-American treaty to establish 
competence over environmental matters.21
The IACtHR often uses other treaties and what it calls the “corpus 
juris of international human rights law”.22 Those are in addition to the 
Inter-American treaties beyond the ACHR that give specific competence 
to the IACtHR for its application.23 But, as I have discussed elsewhere,24 
the IACtHR tends to use only treaties to which the State in question is a 
party, aligning with the requirements of the Vienna Convention, Article 
31.3.c.
The IACtHR has systematically invoked treaties outside of the Inter-
American System as a means to expand its jurisdiction, using Article 29 
of the ACHR as a catapult for expanding its mandate. There is some 
variation in the ways in which this will happen. In more politically 
18. Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, “International Law for Humankind: 
Towards a New Jus Gentium (II)” (2005) 317 Collected Courses of the 
Hague Academy of International Law 9 at 62.
19. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, supra note 5 at 46-47.
20. (2009), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 196.
21. Ibid at para 148.
22. Jo M Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 2d (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 13.
23. Ibid at 122-25.
24. Lixinski, supra note 13.
72 
 
Lixinski, The Consensus Method of Interpretation by the IACtHR
delicate contexts such as economic, social and cultural rights, and 
indigenous rights, municipal law (or internalized international treaties) 
seems to play a larger role in interpreting the ACHR. In other areas, such 
as international humanitarian law, the Court has more easily referred 
to other international treaties as interpretive aids. However, it has also 
shown some reluctance in invoking international criminal law, using 
it only as part of the “factual matrix” of the case, rather than directly 
affecting the interpretation of provisions of the ACHR.25
The case of Yean and Bosico Children v Dominican Republic26 (“Yean 
and Bosico”), involving the denial of nationality to two women of Haitian 
descent born in the Dominican Republic, is particularly relevant to 
thinking about the boundaries of this use of external treaties. In it, the 
court considered the status of a treaty to which the Dominican Republic 
was not a party and whether it could influence the judgment.27
In Yean and Bosico, the IACtHR engaged with a treaty which the 
State had signed, but not ratified. The treaty in question is the Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness,28 which was signed by the Dominican 
Republic on December 5, 1961 and had been in force since December 
13, 1975.29 The treaty had by then only been ratified by 26 States, 
certainly not a particularly representative share of the international 
community sufficient to prove a consensus. Nevertheless, and without 
mentioning the principle of good faith with respect to treaties that have 
not entered into force for a State,30 the IACtHR added the treaty to the 
list of norms that needed to be contextually considered in deciding the 
scope of obligations under the ACHR. In a Separate Opinion in that case, 
Judge Cançado Trindade went even further: he examined the Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness, alongside the Convention Relating to the 
25. Ibid.
26. (2005), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 130 [Yean and Bosico].
27. Ibid at 143.
28. 30 August 1961, 989 UNTS 175 (entered into force 13 December 1975).
29. Yean and Bosico, supra note 26 at 143.
30. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art 18. 
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Status of Stateless Persons,31 and the European Convention on Nationality,32 
to make a claim for a general principle of international law to prevent 
statelessness.33
In engaging in this type of consensus, though, there is a chance 
that the status of the consensus-building tools may get blurred. It is 
one thing to use international treaties to which the State in question 
is a party, a long-recognized method of interpretation contained in the 
Vienna Convention.34 But to use international treaties to which the State 
is not a party, or other sources, to make an argument for the existence 
of applicable general principles of international law, as Judge Cançado 
Trindade did in Yean and Bosico, is a different type of effort. It requires 
the human rights court to find validity in a norm, the existence of which 
still needs to be proven, and then apply it to the State Party. Sometimes 
this application can be done by merging custom and consensus: that is, 
by claiming there is a regional consensus, one can claim there is in fact a 
norm of (regional) customary international law that applies to the parties. 
Consensus can thus become a custom-making tool as well.35
Even if consensus interpretation is in many ways analogous to 
regional customary international law, the ECtHR does not treat 
consensus interpretation as custom. Instead the ECTHR simply treats it 
as as practice under the treaty,36 which is also a recognized means of treaty 
31. 28 September 1954, 360 UNTS 117 (entered into force 6 June 1960).
32. 6 November 1997, Eur TS 166 (entered into force 1 March 2000).
33. See Yean and Bosico, supra note 26 at paras 8-9 for the separate opinion of 
Judge AA Cançado Trindade.
34. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art 31(3)(c). For a discussion on the 
application of this provision by the ECtHR, see Vassilis Tzevelekos, “The 
Use of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the Case-law of the ECtHR: 
an Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the 
Reinforcement of the Teleology of Human Rights? Between Evolution 
and Systemic Integration” (2010) 31 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 621.
35. Vassilis Tzevelekos & Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “International Custom 
Making and the ECtHR’s European Consensus Method of Interpretation” 
(2016) 16 European Yearbook of Human Rights 313 at 343 [Tzevelekos 
& Dzehtsiarou].
36. Ibid at 316.
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interpretation under the Vienna Convention.37 Even if consensus could be 
used as a means to identify regional custom, it is deployed by the ECtHR 
for a different purpose. But admittedly, from an international legal 
perspective, the analogy between custom and consensus interpretation 
helps lend some legitimacy to consensus interpretation more broadly by 
making the method more familiar.38
The IACtHR could use consensus to identify regional custom in the 
Americas, but it has refrained from doing so thus far. Identifying regional 
custom would require making a claim for regionalism and specialization 
in the field of human rights protection that the IACtHR has not often 
done itself, rather opting to selectively rely on ECtHR case law (as well as 
the findings of UN Treaty Bodies) to develop their own jurisprudence. It 
would seem that relying on regional custom could in theory enhance the 
legitimacy of the Inter-American system, at least inasmuch as it would 
clearly ground the IACtHR in the Americas. It would certainly come 
a long way in addressing concerns, expressed by States like Venezuela, 
about the IACtHR allegedly behaving as a “colonial power”, incapable 
of taking local circumstances into account.39 But at the same time, it 
may put the broader legitimacy of international human rights law at risk, 
and which seems to be a more important concern for the IACtHR. The 
important question here is, “legitimacy for whom?” As far as the ECtHR 
is concerned, it would seem that legitimacy before States Parties is the key 
concern. Conversely, for the IACtHR, even though it appears to be more 
criticized by domestic governments than the ECtHR, legitimacy before 
the world seems to be key.
One must bear in mind that, even if regional custom were identified 
as such by the IACtHR, it is unclear whether the court could use it as 
custom or if it would still need to package it as practice under the treaty. 
Given the IACtHR’s fairly restricted mandate, which allows it to directly 
apply only certain Inter-American human rights treaties, it seems no 
practical benefit would arise for the IACtHR to use consensus to apply 
37. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art 31(3)(b).
38. Tzevelekos & Dzehtsiarou, supra note 35 at 342.
39. Pasqualucci, supra note 22 at 303.
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custom. However, pre-existing custom can be, and has been, used to 
challenge domestic law of States Parties as Yean and Bosico demonstrates.
In its use of international treaties as a means of identifying consensus, 
the IACtHR has adopted a somewhat expansionist angle. It does not 
see itself as declaring violations of those treaties, in fact, it has explicitly 
declared that as falling outside its competence. It does, however, use 
international treaties as means to expand on the meaning of provisions 
of the ACHR, and to ultimately build a more harmonized international 
legal order. This practice has an overall positive impact on the legitimacy 
of the IACtHR, but it assumes (or at least unintendedly reinforces) a 
fairly strict separation between the domestic and the international, which 
can be detrimental to the legitimacy of the Court. I will come back to this 
issue below. Before then, it is necessary to examine how the counterpart 
of international law, being domestic law of States not parties to a case, 
has been used. 
III. Consensus via Comparative Law
The use of comparative law (that is, the domestic law of a number of 
countries) is the principal form of consensus interpretation in the 
ECtHR. However, while the IACtHR has used comparative law, it has 
not done so to the same extent. The strict separation between domestic 
and international that the IACtHR adopts prevents more reliance on 
domestic law, even if it would have positive legitimacy impacts on the 
IACtHR.
There are two variations on the use of comparative law as a tool to 
measure consensus: one, used more often, is to rely only on the domestic 
law of the States subject to the human rights tribunal’s jurisdiction; the 
other is to look more broadly at domestic law across the world, regardless 
of whether they are parties to the relevant human rights treaty. While the 
latter practice can have a positive impact on developing general principles 
of law as a source of international law, it seems to be less important for 
the purposes of identifying consensus relevant to the interpretation of 
one specific treaty. As discussed in the previous section, the relationship 
between consensus interpretation and non-treaty sources of international 
law is only an incidental effect and not an objective. That said, the 
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IACtHR has referred to both types of comparative law use.
Consensus interpretation based on domestic law (as a proxy to 
domestic attitudes) is often used with respect to morally sensitive issues, 
such as the ECtHR’s case law on LGBTI rights.40 The same can be said 
with respect to the IACtHR. Atala Riffo and Daughters v Chile41 (“Atala 
Riffo”) is the first case of the IACtHR dealing with LGBTI rights. The 
case revolves around the rights of Karen Atala Riffo and her daughters 
in the context of custody and administrative proceedings. An important 
dimension of the case has to do with disciplinary proceedings against Ms. 
Atala, and the implications of the IACtHR judgment for judicial design 
in Chile.42 For present purposes, I will focus on the custody proceedings, 
and the fact that Ms. Atala is a lesbian in a committed relationship with 
children from a previous (heterosexual) union. I will focus on the custody 
proceedings, resulting in the loss of custody of her three daughters, and 
the case’s focus on the alleged international responsibility of the State for 
discriminatory treatment and arbitrary interference in the private and 
family life suffered by Ms. Atala due to her sexual orientation in this 
matter.43
The IACtHR asserted its role as a subsidiary jurisdiction, holding 
that it would not re-scrutinize the findings of domestic jurisdictions 
on the facts or evidence. It restricted its mandate to compliance with 
international human rights norms.44 Subsidiarity also meant the IACtHR 
would not make a finding with respect to custody.45
In determining whether the IACtHR could include sexual 
orientation among the grounds upon which discrimination is prohibited, 
the IACtHR said that:
[t]he Court has established, as has the European Human Rights Court, that 
40. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, supra note 5 at 34.
41. (2012), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 239 [Atala Riffo].
42. David Kosar & Lucas Lixinski, “Domestic Judicial Design by Regional 
Human Rights Courts” (2015) 109 American Journal of International 
Law 713 [Kosar].
43. Atala Riffo, supra note 41 at para 3.
44. Ibid at para 65.
45. Ibid at para 66.
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human rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation must 
go hand in hand with evolving times and current living conditions[.] This 
evolving interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation set 
forth in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.46
But the IACtHR immediately followed that with the pro homine 
principle, in saying that:
[i]n this regard, when interpreting the words “any other social condition” of 
Article 1(1) of the Convention, it is always necessary to choose the alternative 
that is most favorable to the protection of the rights enshrined in said treaty, 
based on the principle of the rule most favorable to the human being[.]47
Therefore, in this case, evolutionary and teleological interpretations seem 
to come hand in hand. With respect to Latin American consensus, the 
IACtHR said:
[w]ith regard to the State’s argument that, on the date on which the Supreme 
Court issued its ruling there was a lack of consensus regarding sexual 
orientation as a prohibited category for discrimination, the Court points out 
that the alleged lack of consensus in some countries regarding full respect for 
the rights of sexual minorities cannot be considered a valid argument to deny 
or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the historical 
and structural discrimination that these minorities have suffered. The fact 
that this is a controversial issue in some sectors and countries, and that it is 
not necessarily a matter of consensus, cannot lead this Court to abstain from 
issuing a decision, since in doing so it must refer solely and exclusively to the 
stipulations of the international obligations arising from a sovereign decision 
by the States to adhere to the American Convention.48
In the same way the separation of domestic and international was used 
to promote subsidiarity and deference to domestic law early in the 
judgment, that separation is used here to promote the authority of the 
international court (IACtHR).
Consensus interpretation was also invoked by a partially dissenting 
judge in Atala Riffo. Judge Alberto Pérez Pérez used constitutional 
provisions of thirteen Latin American countries to suggest that consensus 
had not emerged as to whether a same-sex couple and the children of one 
of them could be considered a “family”. He clearly tied the evolutionary 
46. Ibid at para 83.
47. Ibid at para 84.
48. Ibid at para 92.
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interpretation of the ACHR to the need for a consensus to be established, 
asserting that, while consensus could be found to support the idea that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation violates human rights, the 
same could not be said about same-sex couples constituting families in 
Latin America.49 It is somewhat telling that the IACtHR seems to have 
ignored what, by all effects, is an orthodox application of the consensus 
method. It has done so in favor of a more progressive interpretation 
of the ACHR with respect to Article 17 (family protection), and still 
used a version of consensus interpretation with respect to the grounds 
for discrimination (Article 1(1)). A selective approach to consensus 
interpretation seems to have been adopted by the IACtHR, meaning that 
only a consensus interpretation that supports a more progressive view of 
human rights will ultimately be deployed by the IACtHR.
Consensus was even more central in Artavia Murillo et al (“In 
Vitro Fertilization”) v Costa Rica.50 In this case, the IACtHR considered 
a prohibition of the practice of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) in Costa 
Rica in the aftermath of a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber of the 
Costa Rican Supreme Court of Justice (“Constitutional Chamber”). The 
IACtHR considered whether the prohibition amounted to an arbitrary 
interference in the right to private life and the right to found a family, the 
right to equality, and the disproportionate impact of the ban on women 
and women’s rights.51 The IACtHR used evolutionary interpretation 
(and consensus as a key component of it) particularly bearing in mind 
that IVF is a procedure that did not exist when the ACHR was drafted, 
and used it in respect to two issues: “(i) the pertinent developments in 
international and comparative law concerning the specific legal status of 
the embryo, and (ii) the regulations and practice of comparative law in 
relation to IVF”.52
With respect to the latter, the IACtHR said that:
[t]he Court considers that, even though there are few specific legal regulations 
49. Ibid at paras 19-23 for the partially dissenting opinion of Judge Alberto 
Pérez Pérez.
50. (2012), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 257.
51. Ibid at para 2.
52. Ibid at para 246.
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on IVF, most of the States of the region allow IVF to be practiced within their 
territory. This means that, in the context of the practice of most States Parties to 
the Convention, it has been interpreted that the Convention allows IVF to be 
performed. The Court considers that this practice by the States is related to the 
way in which they interpret the scope of Article 4 of the Convention, because 
none of the said States has considered that the protection of the embryo should 
be so great that it does not permit assisted reproduction techniques and, in 
particular, IVF. Thus, this generalized practice is associated with the principle 
of gradual and incremental – rather than absolute – protection of prenatal life 
and with the conclusion that the embryo cannot be understand as a person.53
In making this assessment, the IACtHR also relied on rules of the Vienna 
Convention, particularly in articulating “generalized practice” as meaning 
subsequent practice under the ACHR. The Court used consensus to 
rule out the argument that the prohibition of IVF could be justified to 
protect the right to life of the embryo.54 The IACtHR concluded that 
an embryo is not entitled to the right to life until it is implanted in the 
uterus, when it becomes a fetus.55 The IACtHR used multiple methods 
of interpretation, among them, consensus, and decided that they all led 
to a similar conclusion on the matter.
Reliance on comparative law can be useful in examinations of 
proportionality, which is an important element in tension with the 
“Margin of Appreciation” doctrine (at least inasmuch as they both act 
as defenses for the state). Resorting to the law of multiple states helps 
legitimize choices as it testifies to the success of a particular model.56
This practice is somewhat limited, in that it undertakes a fairly 
superficial reading of the law of the other countries involved, particularly 
in the absence of IACtHR cases dealing with the same set of laws in the 
other jurisdictions (which is more often than not the case when invoking 
the consensus method of interpretation). In doing so, an important 
factor to consider is that the analysis fails to take into account the 
domestic context of the many consulted jurisdictions where legislation 
itself does not adequately measure support around an existing law; it is 
53. Ibid at para 256.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid at para 264.
56. Rosalind Dixon, “Proportionality & Comparative Constitutional 
Practice” 5 (manuscript on file, cited with permission).
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simply a proxy for it.57 The situation is perhaps sharper when speaking 
of repeals of legislation, rather than positive creation of statutes. But it 
still applies, at least to the extent that the presence of legislation itself is 
at best an imperfect way to measure consensus, since it fails to take into 
account domestic politics.58 Part of this is just a shortcoming of broad 
comparison in which contextualism falls by the wayside instead focusing 
on functional equivalents across jurisdictions.
In addition, the mechanism of seeking consensus through looking 
at the domestic law of States Parties has been pursued by the IACtHR 
in its advisory competence. According to the drafters of the ACHR, the 
advisory competence of the IACtHR was intended to be wide. They 
particularly envisioned the possibility of States Parties asking for Advisory 
Opinions on the compatibility of their domestic laws with the ACHR,59 a 
type of Advisory Opinion that the IACtHR has rendered on a number of 
occasions.60 In a way, these opinions have paved the way for the IACtHR 
to consider comparative domestic law as an avenue of interpretation.
It was only in a recent Advisory Opinion that the IACtHR tackled 
the matter of consensus interpretation. In the Advisory Opinion on 
57. Ibid at 4.
58. Ibid at 5.
59. Pasqualucci, supra note 22 at 39.
60. Proposed Amendments of the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution 
of Costa Rica (1984), Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser 
A) No 4; Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for 
the Practice of Journalism (Arts 13 & 29 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights) (1985), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am Ct HR 
(Ser A) No 5; The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights (1986), Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-Am Ct HR 
(Ser A) No 6; Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts 14(1), 
1(1) & 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights) (1986), Advisory 
Opinion OC-7/85, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) No 7; Compatibility of Draft 
Legislation with Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (1991), Advisory Opinion OC-12/91, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) 
No 12; International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of 
Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts 1 & 2 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights) (1994), Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 (Ser A) No 14.
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whether corporations are holders of human rights under the ACHR,61 
the IACtHR noted that consensus could be a means to verify whether 
corporations are entitled to human rights. Even though it ultimately 
concluded that extending human rights to corporations fell outside the 
text of the ACHR, it engaged with the idea that evolutionary interpretation 
gives particular relevance to comparative law.62
The IACtHR recognized that all States Parties to the ACHR which 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the court directly granted human rights 
to legal entities. However, there were some differences among States 
Parties with respect to which rights were granted to legal entities and 
which legal entities were entitled to human rights.63 The IACtHR noted 
that, despite their domestic law positions, a number of these countries 
held that ultimately the ACHR did not support conferring human rights 
to legal entities. Specifically, the IACtHR said that differences in approach 
among States Parties, and the fact that the domestic law was not seen as 
being pursuant to implementing the ACHR, made it so that consensus 
was not a determining factor in the interpretation of the ACHR in this 
respect.64
At the time of writing this article, a request for an Advisory Opinion 
of the IACtHR is open and may help shed some light on the consensus 
method in the Inter-American System. This Advisory Opinion is being 
requested by Costa Rica, in which the State asks about the extent of ACHR 
obligations with respect to implementing name changes for transgender 
persons, as well as property rights flowing from same-sex relationships.65 
61. Entitlement of Legal Entities to Hold Rights Under the Inter-American 
Human Rights System (Interpretation and Scope of Article 1(2), in relation 
to Articles 1(2), 8, 11(2), 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 44, 46 and 62(3) of 
the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as of Article 8(1)(A) and 
(B) of the Protocol of San Salvador) (2016), Advisory Opinion OC-22/16, 
Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) No 22.
62. Ibid at para 63.
63. Ibid at para 64.
64. Ibid at paras 66-67.
65. Solicitud de Opinión Consultiva presentada por el Estado de Costa Rica, 
online: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos <www.corteidh.
or.cr/cf/jurisprudencia2/observaciones_oc.cfm?nId_oc=1671>.
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This opinion, being about issues involving changing social mores and 
minority groups, could be an important opportunity for the IACtHR to 
engage again in the consensus method, especially in light of its findings 
in Atala Riffo.
Therefore, the IACtHR’s use of domestic law seems to be more 
restricted to issues not squarely within the ACHR. International treaties, 
on the other hand, are often used in these contexts, and also more 
generally to support the IACtHR’s reasoning. These choices speak to the 
limited reliance by the IACtHR on the domestic law of States, which is 
indicative of its troubled relationship with the principle of subsidiarity, 
discussed further below.
Before getting to that, there is another possibility within the realm of 
consensus interpretation which has been discussed in some particularly 
volatile cases in the IACtHR jurisprudence. These have to do with whether 
a State can rely on relatively clear expressions of domestic democratic will 
as a means to interpret its international human rights obligations. To 
those situations I move next.
IV. Consensus via Domestic Politics
Assuming consensus is related to treaty interpretation, the lack of 
consensus can work for States, since it creates a presumption in favor 
of the solution adopted by the State on a given matter, and deferring 
to said position.66 After all, once the State has deviated from consensus, 
it can justify the domestic posture by stating that consensus does not 
quite cover the State’s interference with human rights, or, even if it does, 
that the State has a particularly strong justification to pursue alternative 
behavior.67
In the ECtHR context, European Consensus is meant to create 
a rebuttable presumption that the ECtHR will follow the majority 
of States Parties. That presumption can be rebutted in the presence 
66. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, supra note 5 at 29.
67. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “European Consensus and the Evolutive 
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights” (2011) 
12 German Law Journal 1730 at 1733 [Dzehtsiarou, “Evolutive 
Interpretation”].
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of “particularities of the historical and political development of a 
respondent State or moral sensitivity on the matter at issue”.68 Rebutting 
the presumption on these grounds, however, imposes a high burden 
on the State, significantly raising the stakes of a case, or at least further 
underlining high stakes.
Consensus can thus be used in international human rights 
adjudication as reliance on internal consensus, that is, the political views 
within certain states, as opposed to across a region. Of tools to gauge 
internal consensus, referenda have been used by the ECtHR on certain 
occasions, in part because of their clarity and “objectivity” on a specific 
matter. Naturally, these tools are not always available, but when they 
are (as in cases involving abortion rights in Ireland), they offer powerful 
subsidies to rebut the presumption in favor of regional consensus on a 
topic.69 In the IACtHR practice, the Court has consistently rejected the 
possibility of relying on internal democratic consensus. Results have been 
mixed in the aftermath of cases, leading to attacks on the legitimacy of 
the IACtHR and its judgments vis-à-vis States Parties.
One instance in which domestic debate and controversy ran 
counter to the IACtHR’s position was Gomes Lund et al (“Guerrilha do 
Araguaia”) v Brazil,70 having to do with amnesty laws enacted in Brazil 
in the aftermath of the country’s military dictatorship (which lasted 
from 1964 to 1985). Between 1972 and 1975, a rural guerrilla group, 
Guerrilha do Araguaia, was persecuted by the military dictatorship, and 
was ultimately decimated by the armed forces. In 1979, an amnesty law 
was enacted in Brazil which covered acts between 1961 and 1979, and 
extended to government officials and non-governmental opposition 
forces. Reparations were granted to surviving relatives of the guerrilla’s 
68. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, supra note 5 at 3.
69. Ibid at 52-54.
70. (2010), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 219 [Gomes]. 
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members in the 1990s.71
A case was brought to the Inter-American Commission by relatives 
of members of the Guerrilha do Araguaia, and made its way to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. Months before the hearing at the 
IACtHR, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
constitutionality of the amnesty law. The Brazilian government made 
an argument based on internal consensus, and relied on the finding of 
the law’s constitutionality. Specifically, it presented an objection to the 
IACtHR’s jurisdiction in the case. The Brazilian government argued that, 
if the IACtHR were to hear the merits of the case, it would in fact, act 
as a court of fourth instance, and review the judgment of the Brazilian 
Federal Supreme Court. To that, the IACtHR responded saying its role 
was not to scrutinize internal legality, but rather compatibility with an 
international human rights treaty.72 In particular, it stated that:
[o]n numerous occasions, the Court has held that ascertaining whether the State 
violated its international obligations by means of its actions before its judicial 
organs, can lead to this Court examining the particular domestic procedures, 
eventually including the decisions of the higher courts, so as to establish the 
compatibility with the American Convention. In the present case, the Inter-
American Court is not called to carry out an analysis of the Amnesty Law in 
relation with the National Constitution of a State, an analysis of domestic law 
which is not of its jurisdiction, and which is an issue of the Non-compliance 
Action No. 153 …, but rather it must assess a conventional control, namely 
to assess the alleged non-compatibility of said law with Brazil’s international 
obligations pursuant to the American Convention. As a consequence, the 
arguments in regard to the objections are matters related directly with the 
merits of the controversy, which can be examined by the Court under [the] 
American Convention, without contravening the rule of the “fourth instance.” 
As such, the Court dismisses this preliminary objection.73
In support of the idea that the judgments of higher domestic courts can 
71. Yolanda Gamarra, “National Responses in Latin America to International 
Events Propelling the Justice Cascade: The Gelman Case” in José María 
Beneyto & David Kennedy, eds, New Approaches to International Law: The 
European and the American Experiences (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 
2012) 75 at 86.
72. Ibid at 87.
73. Gomes, supra note 70 at para 49.
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be scrutinized, the IACtHR cited a number of previous cases.74 It also 
used a number of domestic judgments,75 as well as the findings of regional 
and international bodies (including the African and European Systems, 
the United Nations Security Council, UN Treaty Bodies, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and several UN Rapporteurs, as well 
as International Criminal Tribunals) to make the case for an existing 
international consensus against amnesties.76 The Court concluded by 
saying:
[t]his Court has previously ruled on the matter and has not found legal basis to 
part from its constant jurisprudence that, moreover, coincides with that which 
is unanimously established in international law and the precedent of the organs 
of the universal and regional systems of protection of human rights. In this 
sense, regarding the present case, the Court reiterates that amnesty provisions, 
the statute of limitation provisions, and the establishment of exclusions of 
responsibility that are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment 
of those responsible for serious violations to human rights such as torture, 
summary, extrajudicial, or arbitrary executions, and enforced disappearance are 
not admissible, all of which are prohibited for contravening irrevocable rights 
recognized by International Law of Human Rights.77
In this judgment, the IACtHR used international consensus as a means to 
disregard strong internal consensus, as in Gelman v Uruguay78 (“Gelman”). 
Further, consensus became a tool to maintain findings of the IACtHR 
in comparable cases and not deviate from them. International consensus 
served the purpose of maintaining the internal legitimacy of the IACtHR, 
by making its judgments more consistent among comparable cases.
With respect to the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court’s judgment 
in particular, the IACtHR concluded that Brazil owed an obligation 
74. “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al) v Guatemala (1999), Inter-Am 
Ct HR (Ser C) No 63, at para 222; Escher et al v Brazil (2009) Inter-Am 
Ct HR (Ser C) No 200, at para 44; Dacosta Cadogan v Barbados (2009), 
Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 204, at para 24.
75. Gomes, supra note 70 at paras 163-69.
76. Ibid at paras 150-62.
77. Ibid at para 171, citing Barrios Altos v Perú (2001), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser 
C) No 75, at para 41; La Cantuta v Peru (2006), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) 
No 162, at para 152; “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v Guatemala (2009), Inter-
Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 211, at para 129.
78. (2011), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 221 [Gelman].
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to undertake control of conventionality and thus follow the ACHR, 
as interpreted by the IACtHR, in considering the constitutionality of 
domestic law. The IACtHR said that “[t]he conventional obligations of 
States Parties bind all the powers and organs of the State, those of which 
must guarantee compliance with conventional obligations and its effects 
(effet utile) in the design of its domestic law”.79
After the IACtHR declared amnesties, and specifically the Brazilian 
Supreme Federal Court’s upholding of amnesties, as a breach of 
international human rights obligations, the response of the Brazilian 
government has been, to date, to ignore the IACtHR judgment so as 
not to upset internal consensus. Partial compliance with the judgment 
is underway, but unlike Uruguay which eventually did away with the 
amnesty law, Brazil remains convinced of the importance of the amnesty 
law for internal stability. Thus, in this case, the reliance on international 
consensus, and not allowing for internal consensus to challenge it, has 
meant a direct attack on the legitimacy of the IACtHR and an accusation 
of overreach of its mandate.
In Gelman, the IACtHR examined the issue of going against the 
expressed will of the Uruguayan people. In 1986, Uruguay passed what is 
known as an “Expiry Law”, which essentially shut the door on prosecutions 
for crimes perpetrated during the country’s military dictatorship.80 Two 
plebiscites attempting to change the law failed in 1989 and 2009, and 
the IACtHR in Gelman was then faced with whether these referenda 
79. Gomes, supra note 70 at para 177, citing International Responsibility for the 
Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 
1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights) (1994) Advisory 
Opinion OC-14/94 (Ser A) No 14, at para 35; Miguel Castro-Castro 
Prison v Perú (2006), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 160, at para 394; 
Zambrano Vélez et al v Ecuador (2007), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 166, 
at para 104; Castillo-Petruzzi et al v Peru (1999), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) 
No 59 (considering clause 3); De la Cruz Flores v Perú (2010), Order of 
the Int-Am Ct HR (considering clause 5).
80. For commentary on this law, see generally, Daniel Soltman, “Applauding 
Uruguay ’s Quest for Justice: Dictatorship, Amnesty, and Repeal of 
Uruguay Law No. 15.848.” (2013) 12 Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review 829.
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could justify the existence of the amnesty law.81 In Uruguay, support for 
amnesties in the context of the dictatorship goes back to at least the late 
1970s, when Uruguayans in exile demanded amnesty, for instance, for 
a military officer who fled to Europe because he refused to participate 
in torture in Uruguay. In fact, an amnesty law, commonly known as the 
“National Pacification Law”, was eventually passed, granting amnesties 
to people on both sides of the conflict in Uruguay. This law had several 
loopholes which allowed prosecutions for certain crimes, however the 
military refused to accept these loopholes, and refused to cooperate 
with civilian courts. As a result, the Expiry Law was passed, preventing 
prosecutions for the majority of conduct before March 1, 1985.82
Shortly after the passage of the law, human rights groups mobilized 
and collected enough signatures for a national referendum for the 
abolition of the Expiry Law. This referendum, which took place in 
1989, resulted in 56.7% of the population voting in favor of the Expiry 
Law, and 43.3% voting for its repeal. There has been a fair amount of 
speculation as to whether fear of retaliation from the military played 
a role in this outcome, but no conclusive evidence has been found to 
support the idea.83
The second referendum, in 2009, came when international legal 
opinion from academics and activists had clearly crystalized to say that 
amnesties were incompatible with international law. Uruguay’s Supreme 
Court had similarly found the application of certain parts of the Expiry 
Law to be incompatible with the Constitution in the context of a specific 
criminal case (however, did not rule directly on the constitutionality 
in the abstract). Even still, the President of Uruguay was considering 
prosecuting former Heads of State in Uruguay under the dictatorship. 
81. For an in-depth discussion of this history, see Karen Engle, “Self-Critique, 
(Anti) Politics and Criminalization: Reflections on the History and 
Trajectory of the Human Rights Movement” in José Maria Beneyto & 
David Kennedy, eds, New Approaches to International Law: The European 
and the American Experiences (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2012) 41 at 
61-68.
82. Ibid at 62-63.
83. Ibid at 64.
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Regardless, the referendum failed to repeal the law again.84
To whether the referenda could be validly used to oppose the 
IACtHR’s very strong anti-amnesty stance, the Court stated:
[t]he fact that the Expiry Law of the State has been approved in a democratic 
regime and yet ratified or supported by the public, on two occasions, namely, 
through the exercise of direct democracy, does not automatically or by itself 
grant legitimacy under International Law. The participation of the public 
in relation with the law, using methods of direct exercise of democracy, – 
referendum (paragraph 2 of Article 79 of the Constitution of Uruguay) – in 
1989 and “plebiscite (letter A of Article 331 of the Constitution of Uruguay) 
regarding a referendum that declared as null Articles 1 and 4 of the Law – 
therefore, October 25, 2009, should be considered, as an act attributable to the 
State that give rise to its international responsibility.
The bare existence of a democratic regime does not guarantee, per se, the 
permanent respect of International Law, including International Law of Human 
Rights, and which has also been considered by the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter. … the protection of human rights constitutes a impassable limit to 
the rule of the majority, that is, to the forum of the “possible to be decided” 
by the majorities in the democratic instance, those who should also prioritize 
“control of conformity with the Convention” … which is a function and task 
of any public authority and not only the Judicial Branch. … Other domestic 
courts have also referred to the limits of democracy in relation to the protection of 
fundamental rights.85
The IACtHR then went on to consider the domestic jurisprudence not 
only of States Parties to the ACHR (like Costa Rica and Colombia), 
but also of non-parties such as the United States. The IACtHR even 
considered countries outside the Americas such as Slovenia, South Africa, 
and Switzerland. In casting such a wide net, one could say the IACtHR 
relied on a version of “international consensus” in other countries’ 
domestic legal systems, and of domestic courts relying on international 
consensus via international instruments, to overrule internal consensus.
The exercise in Gelman of looking at other domestic jurisdictions 
seems to align with what the ECtHR once did when it referred to 
“international trends”, that is, the domestic law of States outside the 
jurisdictional scope of the court, as a means to identify consensus building 
84. Ibid at 65-66.
85. Gelman, supra note 78 at paras 238-39 [emphasis added].
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worldwide.86 This tool is too much of an interpretive stretch and does 
little to enhance the legitimacy of a regional body before States Parties. 
But, it can enhance the body’s legitimacy before stakeholders outside the 
jurisdictional scope of the court, which seems to be a desirable outcome 
for the IACtHR.
Coupled with the conventionality control doctrine, Gelman shows 
a limited understanding and use of subsidiarity as a governing principle 
of international law.87 This is in marked contrast with the embrace of 
subsidiarity in Atala Riffo. In fact, the IACtHR in Gelman insisted on 
a separation between domestic circumstances and international law, 
circumscribing its role as assessing compatibility with international 
legal obligations, regardless of domestic consensus. In Atala Riffo, the 
same argument of separation was made to isolate certain aspects of 
the domestic proceedings, such as the merits of the custody hearing. 
In Gelman, though, the IACtHR went as far as suggesting that the 
referenda, which had been organized by the State, were in fact acts of 
State for which Uruguay was internationally responsible.88 So, while the 
separation between domestic and international meant subsidiarity and 
legitimacy in Atala Riffo, it meant disregarding domestic consensus and 
mandate creep in Gelman.
In the aftermath of the IACtHR judgment in Gelman, the President 
of Uruguay signed a law repealing the Expiry Law, just a few days before 
the statutes of limitations created additional obstacles for prosecution. 
The new law also made certain conduct before March 1, 1985 criminal 
under international law, to which statutory limitations did not apply, 
thus chastising the country’s Supreme Court which had, in May 2011, 
classified enforced disappearances as an ordinary crime.89 Therefore, the 
reliance on international consensus helped override internal consensus 
not only as far as the IACtHR was concerned, but it also helped 
86. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, supra note 5 at 65.
87. Jorge Contesse, “Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System” (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 123 
at 135.
88. Gamarra, supra note 71 at 90.
89. Engle, supra note 81 at 66.
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domestically, where arguments about international consensus became 
vital in overturning the law.
Importantly, though, one must be mindful of what reliance on internal 
consensus ultimately means for the legitimacy of an international court. 
To be sure, it may mean more ready acceptance of a Court’s judgment 
domestically if it takes into account strong domestic support, but at the 
same time it can have negative ripple effects across a region, especially if 
the regional court is seen to be creating exceptions in its own case law. 
On the other hand, as Mahoney has argued, “[w]here societal values are 
still the subject of debate and controversy at national level, they should 
not easily be converted by the Court into protected Convention values 
allowing for only one approach”.90
These multiple threads of consensus interpretation all relate to the 
legitimacy of the IACtHR. Some of them can be used to enhance the 
legitimacy of the IACtHR vis-à-vis States Parties, whereas others seem to 
have the opposite effect, and actually align themselves more closely with 
the idea that, because human rights law is quintessentially a counter-
majoritarian type of discourse, it should not worry about democratic will 
(which in fact can be oppressive of minorities). Underlying the uses of 
consensus interpretation are questions about the (de)legitimizing effects 
of treaty interpretation by the IACtHR. But a number of questions need 
to be answered in order to understand how legitimacy plays a role in the 
IACtHR’s context. The next section addresses these issues.
V. Consensus and Legitimacy
In the European context, consensus interpretation is fundamentally a 
response to legitimacy challenges raised. These are challenges raised against 
attempts by the ECtHR when it engages in evolutionary interpretation, 
or the idea of treating the ECHR as a living instrument that must be 
adapted to everyday circumstances.91 Because evolutionary interpretation 
90. Paul Mahoney, “Marvellous Richness of Diversity of Invidious Cultural 
Relativism?” (1998) 17 Human Rights Law Journal 1 at 3, cited in 
Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, supra note 5 at 54.
91. Dzehtsiarou, “Evolutive Interpretation”, supra note 67 at 1730. 
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is also a common feature of the IACtHR’s jurisprudence (as discussed 
above), staking consensus interpretation against evolution, and the 
legitimacy concerns that come with it, seems to be a good starting point. 
The adjudication of international human rights law by regional 
courts is for the most part considered to be subsidiary to States’ own 
efforts in internalizing these norms and following them. Therefore, at the 
crux of the debate between evolutionary interpretation and consensus 
is the respect that regional human rights courts owe to the principle of 
subsidiarity, and therefore respect to States’ rights to implement their 
own international human rights obligations. It is only when subsidiarity 
fails that consensus comes into operation, as a means to bring the human 
rights court to a point that simultaneously respects its own subsidiary role 
by paying respect to States’ discretion as a first step of its reasoning, but 
at the same time advancing human rights protection (using other States’ 
discretionary application of human rights norms to impose responsibility 
on a non-complying State).
The breadth of subsidiarity granted to a State (in the ECtHR’s 
terminology, the State’s Margin of Appreciation) depends on: (1) the 
nature of the right protected; (2) its importance; (3) the interference by 
the State on the enjoyment of said right; (4) the object of interference; 
and (5) regional consensus around the issue.92 Evolutionary interpretation 
is a counterpoint to subsidiarity that can undermine the legitimacy of a 
human rights court, at least in that it may require a human rights court 
to undermine its own judgments, thus reducing the predictability of 
outcomes. Consensus, or more specifically the change in consensus, 
can work as a shield to help a court justify a change of position.93 The 
IACtHR uses consensus to reinforce its own case law, as discussed above.
As Jorge Contesse has argued, the IACtHR “embraces a maximalist 
model of adjudication”, one that makes little to no room for State 
discretion, or subsidiarity more generally.94 In fact, former IACtHR 
Judge and President, Cançado Trindade, has been a strong opponent of 
92. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, supra note 5 at 135.
93. Ibid at 139.
94. Contesse, supra note 87 at 124.
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the IACtHR officially adopting the doctrine of margin of appreciation.95 
Part of the reason for Trindade’s opposition rests in a distrust of domestic 
judicial and other legal structures, particularly the lack of strong 
judiciaries, a problem that the IACtHR has consistently tackled in its own 
jurisprudence. As I have co-argued elsewhere, when the IACtHR engages 
with domestic judiciaries, it does so with the intent of strengthening 
domestic institutions; but, in doing so, the IACtHR also strengthens 
itself.96 It is thus unclear whether the building up of domestic legal 
structures could ever reach a stage in which subsidiary could be trusted 
by cynics to perform the role of restricting the scope of application of 
the IACtHR. The consequence is that the maximalist approach of the 
IACtHR still reigns, and with it, evolutionary interpretation.
Attacks on the legitimacy of the IACtHR and its perceived 
“intrusiveness” seem incapable of mounting a credible challenge to its 
expansive mandate. This attitude makes it nearly impossible for the 
IACtHR to seriously engage with consensus interpretation as a means to 
restrict its own mandate. After all, excessive deference to States Parties, 
the first step triggering the use of consensus interpretation, is missing .97 
But the fact that consensus method can lend additional legitimacy to the 
IACtHR creates an incentive for the method to be deployed in other, 
creative ways.
Consensus interpretation is one way of representing the tipping point 
necessary for evolutionary interpretation of a human rights treaty. It also 
helps draw a clearer line in the balancing of subsidiarity and evolution.98 
However, consensus interpretation does not necessarily run counter to 
evolution, it merely slows down the pace of evolution by restricting some 
95. Ibid at 133-34.
96. Kosar and Lixinski, supra note 42 at 747.
97. But see Nino Tsereteli, “Emerging doctrine of deference of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights?” (2016) 20 International Journal of 
Human Rights 1097 (arguing for the emergence of a doctrine of deference 
in the IACtHR practice, at least in regard to cases that do not involve 
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of it.99
States in the European context still use their original consent as a 
means to challenge the ECtHR.100 Similarly, in the Americas, a range of 
States have criticized the IACtHR’s action for straying too far from the 
original consensus of States Parties. As a result, there have been proposals 
for “strengthening process[es]” with respect to the Inter-American System 
within the parent organization, which would undermine the Inter-
American Commission’s powers.101 It may even undermine attempts at 
pitting one organ of the Inter-American System against another, such as 
the request for an Advisory Opinion in which Venezuela asked the Inter-
American Court to explain whether it had the power to “control the 
legality” of acts of the Commission. If the Court said yes, it would risk 
alienating the Commission; if the Court said no, it would come across 
as ineffectual towards States Parties.102 Regardless, the IACtHR is usually 
dismissive of original consent, and instead relies on the protection of 
human rights (the pro homine approach) as the key goal of its interpretive 
activity.
A related argument is that the opposite of consensus is pluralism, 
which can also be seen as a desirable goal.103 Pluralism can be not only 
ethnic pluralism, but also recognition of the diversity of legal solutions, 
and, with it, the authority of individual States to rule their own affairs. 
But in the ethnic context, consensus interpretation also has its potential 
problematic effects, as Benvenisti argues.104 After all, it can prevent courts 
from fulfilling their roles as independent guardians of an international 
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human rights treaty.105 This is a reason why it has been rejected by the 
IACtHR in Atala Riffo,106 as discussed above. The counter-majoritarian 
argument also played a role in Gelman, discussed above. The IACtHR 
in Gelman stated that international human rights law is a limit on 
majoritarian rule, and as such should be implemented by States in 
spite of existing domestic consensus.107 Thus, it seems that the counter-
majoritarian argument can be used to reject consensus interpretation 
across the board by a court, like the IACtHR, staunchly in favor of 
human rights and the protection of less favored social groups.
Relatedly, there is naturally a risk that too much emphasis on 
consensus as a tool for interpretation will promote a “lowest common 
denominator” approach to human rights protection, which is the 
opposite of what a human rights court’s mandate should be. Judges at 
the ECtHR seem to be aware of this risk.108 This is precisely a risk that 
the IACtHR seems to wish to avoid when it sets a higher bar to human 
rights protection through mechanisms like pro homine interpretation and 
conventionality control.
As a result, the IACtHR avoids the limiting potentials of consensus 
interpretation. It will rely on them in order to assert legitimacy of its 
already existing jurisprudence, but not when consensus challenges said 
jurisprudence. In doing so, the IACtHR seems to imply that it draws 
legitimacy not from the States Parties, but from external stakeholders, 
and an abstract idea of human rights and human dignity. Thus, consensus 
will be used more readily if it is in line with an expansion of the IACtHR’s 
mandate.
VI. Conclusion
It seems that the IACtHR searches for consensus across a number of areas, 
many of which match strategies adopted by the ECtHR. But, in doing so, 
the IACtHR does not use consensus as closely tied to subsidiarity; rather, 
105. Dzehtsiarou, “Evolutive Interpretation”, supra note 67 at 1735.
106. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, supra note 5 at 127-28.
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it seems to reject subsidiarity, and use the separation between domestic 
and international not as a means to promote subsidiarity, but rather as 
a means to distance itself from domestic concerns that may have impact 
on its judgments. It is only broader domestic consensus that will be relied 
upon, and, even then, more often than not in support of more expansionist 
interpretations of the ACHR. In this sense, consensus interpretation in 
the IACtHR jurisprudence appears to be not a mechanism of legitimacy 
vis-à-vis States Parties, but one of mandate creep.
In other words, the activity of the IACtHR on consensus 
interpretation does not seem to be particularly connected to the 
subsidiarity of human rights. It is rather undertaken, in conjunction 
with other interpretive techniques, to advance a greater mandate for the 
IACtHR, one that seeks legitimacy not from the States Parties, but rather 
from external sources. The corpus juris of international human rights may 
be a legitimating source, and it is something the IACtHR sees itself as 
contributing to first and foremost. Thus, while in the ECtHR context, 
consensus interpretation is a tool to enhance legitimacy vis-à-vis States 
Parties, this is only partly true in the IACtHR context. In fact, it seems 
that legitimacy gains are only seen as unintended consequences of the 
use of consensus interpretation, and not their objective. The IACtHR’s 
primary commitment is still to the defense of human rights in the region, 
in spite of States Parties.
This attitude of the IACtHR can have deep impacts on its legitimacy 
vis-à-vis States Parties. Even if this legitimacy is not a primary concern 
for the IACtHR, it ultimately affects its ability to promote the change 
it seeks to implement across the Americas. The IACtHR should thus 
consider the possibilities of consensus interpretation more seriously, at 
least inasmuch as it can create pathways for entrenchment of the ACHR, 
as interpreted by the IACtHR.
